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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter
1
 by 
Joan Williams is illuminating, intellectually challenging, and insightful. It 
is not, however, a typical law professor book. Neither academic inquiry nor 
policy analysis (although it contains elements of both), Reshaping the 
Work-Family Debate is more of a manifesto. Williams seeks measurable 
and meaningful change in the family and work lives of Americans, even if 
that change is imperfect or incomplete, and she sees theoretical or ideologi-
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, IIT. Thanks are due to Marty Ma-
lin, who invited me to write this review. 
1. JOAN WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER
(2011). 
568 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 15:567 
cal rigidity as one obstacle to such change. Thus, for example, she judges 
harshly those feminists who opposed maternity leave policies as incon-
sistent with the principle that “women be treated the same as men,”2 a view 
that “predominated for decades among feminist groups inside the Belt-
way.”3 Williams recounts a particularly infuriating 2006 conversation with 
a “prominent feminist” who 
confided to me . . . that women’s groups in Washington could have got-
ten maternity leave a decade before the passage of the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act in 1993. Historical study documents that California con-
gressman Howard Berman wanted to do for the country what he had 
done for California: pass a four-month maternity leave. When he ap-
proached inside-the-Beltway feminists, they refused to support the 
measure. Instead they fought on for ten more years, insisting that the 
right to maternity leave be folded into the rights of workers to take 
leaves for their own health reasons. During that conversation in 2006, all 
I could think of were the women who, in that decade, had gone without 
maternity leave. That included me.
4
 
Whether or not mandatory maternity leave really could have been en-
acted in the 1980s (I am skeptical), Williams’ bigger point animates her en-
tire project. Real women have real babies and sometimes lose their real 
jobs. Real people have real lives and suffer real hardship. Trying to address 
that hardship, or as Williams puts it elsewhere, “[s]eeking to make a con-
crete change in the world,” requires appealing to all kinds of different peo-
ple,
5
 without insisting that key aspects of their lives, their values, and their 
folkways, are unacceptable. Politics are messy, and ideological purity is not 
helpful to coalition building. Better to identify common interests and values 
and find ways to build on them. 
Williams believes that such coalition-building is essential to address-
ing the hardships she decries. Although she has a lengthy list of policy pro-
posals, including paid short-term leaves, affordable, high-quality child care, 
elimination of joint tax returns, and true universal health coverage,
6
 she 
spends very little time in this book making the case for them because she 
believes that in our current political climate, enactment of such policies is 
2. Id. at 118. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Joan C. Williams, Overeducated Achievatrons Unite!, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 845, 855 
(2011); see also Laura T. Kessler, Feminism for Everyone, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 679, 683 (2011) (de-
scribing Williams’ “methodological innovation in her simultaneous vision of radical transformations 
and incremental change” and its accompanying combination of theory and pragmatism); Katharine B. 
Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733, 741 (2011) (noting that it is “no surprise” that 
Williams’ “practical politics” are sometimes “in tension with theoretical coherence, as successful prac-
tical politics frequently are”). 
6. Williams, supra note 1, at 35-40. 
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impossible. So she wants to change that climate. Indeed, Williams does not 
pull any punches about her ambitions: “Writ large,” she says on the very 
first page of the Introduction, “this book is about reframing American poli-
tics.”7 
As the subtitle of the book suggests, that reframing requires feminists 
to engage men in the project to address work-family conflict. It also re-
quires progressives to build coalitions with the white working class. These 
two basic arguments, which form the underlying structure of the book, op-
erate somewhat differently from each other. Williams’ arguments about 
men and feminism rest on her pathbreaking work on the theoretical and 
cultural underpinnings of the gender divide in family and work life, in par-
ticular her 2000 book, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict 
and What To Do About It.
8
 Thus the half (or so) of the book that is about 
men and feminism has a robust theoretical underpinning and indeed one of 
her chapters, Reconstructive Feminism, is largely a discussion of feminist 
theory, albeit one that has significant practical implications for work-family 
balance. The half (or so) of the book that is about class, on the other hand, 
rests on a more empirical, less theoretical foundation. Relying on an ex-
haustive analysis of “every major ethnography of the white working class 
in the late-twentieth-century United States”9 and her own trenchant obser-
vations of the American political landscape, Williams argues that progres-
sives must come to better understand and respect white working class 
Americans in order to rebuild the New Deal Coalition. Although she illus-
trates dramatically that work-family conflict is not a “champagne problem” 
experienced only by the upper middle class,
10
 and she discusses the mean-
ing and role of work and family in the lives of the working class, her dis-
cussion here goes far beyond her primary policy focus. Indeed, the last two 
chapters of her book should be read – no, studied – by all Democratic can-
didates. 
In Part II of this review, I describe and evaluate Williams’ arguments 
about men and feminism, and argue that she might do better to consistently 
couch the arguments in the more nuanced language (that she in fact some-
times uses) of masculinity and femininity, rather than men and women. The 
implications of this distinction are not unimportant for her pragmatic pro-
ject, as I will explain. In Part III, I describe and evaluate Williams’ discus-
7. Id. at 1. 
8. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2000). 
9. Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 770 
(2011). 
10. WILLIAMs, supra note 1, at 14. 
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sions of work-family conflict for the working class and her analysis of the 
political and cultural relationship between upper middle class progressives 
and the white working class. Finally, in Part IV, I bring the two strands to-
gether to argue that the issues with which Williams is especially concerned 
– work and family – may be particularly rich issues for forging the coali-
tions that she seeks in large part because of their centrality to people’s 
lives. Part IV also discusses some gaps in Williams’ analysis, such as her 
lack of focus on single parents. These gaps are ripe for future work by Wil-
liams and by the many activists and academics she inspires. 
II. MEN AND WOMEN, OR MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY, IN THE
WORKPLACE AND AT HOME 
Because Williams’ discussion of men and women in the workplace 
rests on her earlier, more theoretical work, it is helpful to summarize some 
of the insights from her brilliant book, Unbending Gender. In that book 
(and in other work), Williams explores the illuminating concept of domes-
ticity as a successor to patriarchy as a lived ideology. Patriarchy provides 
that women are inferior and should be subordinate to men.
11
 Patriarchy is 
neither descriptively accurate nor normatively acceptable to most Ameri-
cans. Domesticity, on the other hand, is much subtler and allows for the il-
lusion of individual choice. It also incorporates values that are – unlike the 
values of female subordination and inferiority – at least somewhat norma-
tively appealing to modern sensibilities. 
Domesticity has two main tenets. First, it holds that employers are en-
titled to ideal workers. An ideal worker is one who is fully available to the 
employer; that is, an ideal worker is an employee who has no regular fami-
ly obligations that might interfere with his or her availability to the em-
ployer.
12
 One consequence of this tenet is that men are both entitled and 
required to be ideal workers,
13
 a point to which Williams returns in some 
detail in her new work. The second major tenet of domesticity is that 
“mothers should have ‘all the time and love in the world to give’” to their 
children.
14
 
The tenets of domesticity are inextricably tied to a belief in “separate 
spheres” – an ideology under which men are believed best suited to the 
rough-and-tumble world of the workplace and the market, while women, 
with their more emotional and nurturing qualities, are more suited for the 
11. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 21-23. 
12. Id. at 20. 
13. Id. at 25. 
14. Id. at 30 (quoting Deborah Fallows, A Mother’s Work 13 (1985)).
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home.
15
 Separate spheres ideology may be old, dating back to the eight-
eenth century,
16
 but it is alive and well today, as Williams deftly illustrates 
in the very first chapter of Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, and it as-
serts a kind of hegemonic pall over the lived experiences of men and wom-
en. It provides a frame through which they see and describe themselves; it 
creates a set of expectations that many men and women cannot or do not 
wish to meet; and it creates social and political schisms not only between 
men and women, but between men and other men and between women and 
other women. Disrupting that frame is crucial. 
A. The Half-Life of Separate Spheres Ideology 
In the first chapter of Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, entitled Opt 
Out or Pushed Out?, Williams illustrates the continued strength and power 
of separate spheres ideology by analyzing and critiquing media coverage of 
work-family issues, relying on an empirical study conducted by her Center 
for WorkLife Law at the University of California Hastings College of the 
Law.
17
 There is, she argues, a dominant narrative about work-family con-
flict that recurs in media coverage of the issue. In this narrative, work-
family conflict arises when mothers feel an overwhelming desire to be at 
home with their children.  Because of this overwhelming desire, many 
women “opt out” of the workforce. 
The iconic version of this type of media coverage is Lisa Belkin’s in-
famous New York Times Magazine article, The Opt Out Revolution,
18
 
which was followed less than two years later by a front-page New York 
Times article reporting on a “trend” of undergraduate women at Yale who 
planned to be stay-at-home mothers.
19
 As Williams points out, these and 
many other articles like them – her study analyzed 119 articles published 
between 1980 and 2006
20
 – allege “trends” on the basis of nothing more 
than interviews with a few individuals, with no effort to substantiate the 
15. Id. at 23-23, 31-32. Williams explains: “Domesticity created a symbolic world that divided 
into a private sphere of selfless women and a public sphere of market actors pursuing their own self-
interest.” Id. at 31. Because the market is a tough and unforgiving place, relegating child care to the 
market – as opposed to one parent providing it in the home – is frightening and reinforces the notion 
that mothers are and should be endlessly available to their children. Id. at 31-32. 
16. Id. at 23. 
17. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 13; see JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW,
UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT? HOW THE PRESS COVERS 
WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT – THE UNTOLD STORY OF WHY WOMEN LEAVE THE WORKFORCE (2006).  
18. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (magazine) at 42.
19. Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path to Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2005, at A1. Williams catalogs a number of other New York Times articles from the mid-2000s 
that fit this pattern. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 13. 
20. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 13. 
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claims by reference to other data.
21
 
This media coverage reinforces the “separate spheres” understanding 
of women’s roles in its discussion of what happens after the “opt-out” deci-
sion. Women “com[e] to love the homemaker role.”22 even if there is a pe-
riod of adjustment. After all, women are (or at least should be) selfless and 
entirely dedicated to their children.
23
 Moreover, much of the press coverage 
suggests, inaccurately, that the only economic consequence of opting out is 
giving up a few luxuries.
24
 The subtext is clear: women who choose to stay 
in the workforce are not only depriving their children of their undivided at-
tention, but they are selfish and materialistic. This message has proven to 
have remarkable staying power in our culture. 
B. What Separate Spheres Does to Men 
Just as women are expected to devote all their time and attention to 
their children, “Americans overwhelmingly expect men to be providers.”25 
And to be a good provider, men, especially upper middle class men, must 
be “ideal workers” – always available, committed to their jobs, “making 
work the central focus of their lives.”26 “In other words, although work-
family conflict traditionally is associated with women, a primary cause of 
work-family conflict is masculinity. Inflexible workplaces have proved so 
hard to change, in significant part, because of the intertwining of masculini-
ty with work schedules and current understandings of work commitment.”27 
The workplace, Williams tells us, is a “gender factory.”28 She thus rejects 
as “utterly unrealistic” the notion that the solution to work/family conflict 
is for “women [to] negotiate more effectively with their husbands.”29 In-
stead, she argues, things will not improve for women until the workplace 
gender factory is at least partially dismantled. It is for this reason that she 
believes a focus on men – or, as I would put it, on masculinity – is essential 
21. Id. at 14. 
22. Id. at 17. Williams also notes that although the media accounts do sometimes describe wom-
en’s struggles with depression, loneliness, or loss of status, they fail “to take these problems seriously.” 
Id. at 16. Nor does the press coverage discuss the longterm economic consequences of leaving the 
workforce especially if these women divorce or are widowed. Id. at 21, 24-26; see infra notes 38-40 and 
accompanying text. 
23. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 23. 
24. Id. at 26. 
25. Id. at 32. 
26. Id. at 33. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 83 (citing SARAH FENSTERMAKER, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF
WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS (1985), which Williams describes as asserting that “family dynam-
ics are the anvil upon which gender relations are forged”). 
29. Id. at 88. 
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to the kinds of workplace and policy changes she advocates. 
Because men are supposed to be good providers, and because being a 
good provider requires being an ideal worker, men are often unwilling even 
to admit that they have work-family conflicts. “[A] man who fails to per-
form as an ideal worker risks being seen as both a bad father [for not ade-
quately providing] and a failure as a man [for not being an ideal worker].”30 
Williams, who is particularly adept at bringing her points to life with real-
life examples from sociological and ethnographic research, offers this an-
ecdote by way of illustration: 
Consider the case of Rich, a young engineer with a growing family. 
When his boss spoke enthusiastically of the need to hold a particular 
meeting as soon as possible, he reacted with panic. “Sweating like a 
horse,” he called his secretary. “Hey, you gotta get me out of this, be-
cause my baby is getting christened and if I don’t meet with the priest 
it’s not going to happen and my family is going to kill me and my wife 
will divorce me and I won’t have any kids and my life will be terri-
ble.” . . . [Yet] confronting this issue directly apparently seemed out of 
the question: he was dependent on his boss for good assignments and a 
future with the firm.
31
 
As Rich’s story suggests, many men are unhappy about the traditional 
breadwinner role that they find themselves playing. Here, Williams is fo-
cusing on upper middle class professional men – those who work enormous 
numbers of hours a week.
32
 “Men who work fifty to sixty hours weekly 
would prefer to work an average of thirteen fewer hours a week; those 
working sixty or more hours would prefer to work a stunning twenty-five 
hours fewer.”33 Even men who embrace the ideal worker/breadwinner role 
and who work large numbers of hours may come to regret the time they 
missed with their children and often find that all of their “social relation-
ships” are maintained by their wives, leaving them without meaningful re-
lationships of their own.
34
 
As a result, Williams claims, “Deconstructing masculine norms – both 
workplace norms and norms that link masculinity with stunted personal ex-
pressiveness – is an agenda that should hold attraction for men . . . .”35 She 
repeats this notion again and again: “If feminists can learn to engage elite 
30. Id. at 80. 
31. Id. at 88 (quoting Marianne Cooper, Being the “Go-To Guy”: Fatherhood, Masculinity, and 
the Organization of Work in Silicon Valley, in FAMILIES AT WORK: EXPANDING THE BOUNDS 5, 21 
(Naomi Gerstel et al. eds., 2002)). 
32. One interesting and unresolved tension in the book surrounds working class men’s attitudes 
towards long hours of work. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
33. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 81. 
34. Id. at 82. 
35. Id. at 83. 
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men, their workplace dissatisfaction could be a powerful force for 
change.”36 She also holds out the explicit hope that generational change 
will help bring about such alliances: “Feminists . . . must ally ourselves 
with men like Kirk [who quit his high-powered Silicon Valley job] and 
bring about nonstigmatized career tracks that offer Gen X and Gen Y men 
good careers and time for family life. Otherwise, women will continue to 
do the bulk of family and household work and will also continue to pay a 
steep economic price.”37 
C. What Separate Spheres Ideology Does to Women 
It costs. As already noted, the media’s opt-out narrative fails to report 
accurately the economic consequences to women who leave the workforce. 
Williams reports, “One study found that women who took just one year out 
of the workforce sacrificed 20 percent of their lifetime earnings. Women 
who took two or three years earned 30 percent less.”38 Women who divorce 
or are widowed can find their economic circumstances plummet. “Divorced 
women in the United States are five times more likely to live in poverty 
during retirement than married women.”39 The media virtually never dis-
cusses these economic risks.
40
 
Another inaccuracy in the media portrayal – and one that feeds direct-
ly into separate spheres ideology – is that there is a significant trend of 
women opting out of the workforce. In fact, Williams cites studies estab-
lishing that among married mothers in the upper middle class and the mid-
dle class, only 20 to 23 percent are stay-at-home mothers.
41
 Labor force 
participation is thus the rule, not the exception, although many mothers do 
not work full-time. Among women born between 1966 and 1975 (Genera-
36. Id. at 90. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 25 (citing STEVEN J. ROSE & HEIDI I. HARTMANN, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y 
RESEARCH, STILL A MAN’S LABOR MARKET: THE LONG-TERM EARNINGS GAP (2004), available at 
<www.iwpr.org/ publications/pubs/still-a-mans-labor-market-the-long-term-earnings-gap >). 
39. Id. at 21 (citing STEVEN J. HAIDER ET AL., UNIV. OF MICH. RET. RESEARCH CTR., THE
ECONOMIC STATUS OF ELDERLY DIVORCED WOMEN 1 (2003), available at <http://www.mrrc. 
isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp046.pdf >). Williams argues for a rethinking of who owns the 
ideal worker’s wage when a husband in the workforce is supported by his stay-at-home wife’s domestic 
work. Both are contributing to the husband’s ability to earn the ideal worker wage. But at divorce, the 
wage is treated as all his. Recognizing that both members of the couple contribute to it – and that this 
would be true if the woman were in the workplace and the father were at home – allows a more equita-
ble distribution of that wage after divorce. Id. at 132-33. 
40. Id. at 24-26. 
41. Id. at 19 (citing JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & 
WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-
FAMILY CONFLICT: THE POOR, THE PROFESSIONALS AND THE MISSING MIDDLE 6-7, tbl. 1 & fig. 2 
(2010)). 
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tion X), “only 44 percent of all women but 55 percent of professional ones 
are employed full time year round.”42 
To say that women are active participants in the labor force is not to 
say that their experience is untroubled, which may explain, at least in part, 
why so many women do not work full time. And this is one of the greatest 
inaccuracies in the media narrative. The media portrays women as making 
a “choice” to opt out, removing any need to examine the ways in which 
women are pushed out of the workforce. Women cite workplace discrimi-
nation against mothers,” which Williams calls “the maternal wall,”43 such 
as the need to prove themselves over and over because of assumptions that 
they are not competent.
44
 Some of the professional women interviewed in 
the media coverage also cite the inflexibility of an “all-or-nothing work-
place:” a workplace that demands the constant availability of the ideal 
worker.
45
 Given true choice, many women who leave the workforce alto-
gether would prefer “to work the traditional full-time (forty-hour) work-
week.”46 
Women also cite their husbands’ work hours. The all-or-nothing 
workplace packs a double whammy for upper middle class women: their 
husbands work much longer hours than do other men.
47
 “Having a husband 
who works more than fifty hours a week increases the odds of a woman 
quitting her job by 44 percent. Having a husband who works more than six-
ty hours a week increases her odds of quitting by 112 percent.”48 In this 
context, Williams argues, describing a decision to leave the workplace as a 
“choice” overlooks the real-world factors – factors that both arise from and 
reinforce separate spheres ideology – that constrain the decision. 
D. Reconstructive Feminism and Nonconformity 
Of course, not all women are the same. “The assumption that women 
will join in automatic sisterhood reflects an unwarranted premise: that 
42. Id. (citing Christine Percheski, Opting Out? Cohort Differences in Professional Women’s 
Employment Rates from 1960 to 2005, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 497, 505-06 (2008)). 
43. Id. at 27-28, 92-93. 
44. Id. at 93-96. In describing these forms of discrimination, Williams relies on “a quarter-century 
of social science” research. Id. at 93. One study she describes, for example, “asked male and female 
psychology professors to evaluate identical applications for a professorship.” Id. The male candidate 
was preferred over the female candidate two to one. Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on 
the Review of Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical Study, 
41 SEX ROLES 509, 520 (1999).  
45. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 30. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 31. 
48. Id. 
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women are inevitably bound together by their experience of womanhood. 
The experience of gender divides women as often as it unites them.”49 As 
one specific example, Williams explains that 
women who perform as ideal workers often have paid a higher price than 
men for doing so: most either gave up having children or struggled with 
the dual demands of work and motherhood, facing daily challenges and 
abiding fears that they were being “bad moms.” Many of these women 
have a lot invested in the view that being an ideal worker is what the job 
takes: otherwise, why did they sacrifice having children or spending time 
with them? These women cannot realistically be expected to join with 
younger generations of women to change the workplace.”50 
Even women who have taken on the ideal worker role, however, stand 
to gain from a deconstruction of its gendered nature. Like Ann Hopkins in 
Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
51
 a woman who is seen as too aggressive or 
abrasive may find her advancement stymied even when such traits are 
prized in their male colleagues. As Williams argues, liberating the work-
place from masculine norms will benefit such women as well as those who 
are more traditionally feminine. 
Changes in work norms will benefit men as well – both men who want 
to be breadwinners while still having some time with their families and 
men who want to choose a less traditional path. “A key goal . . . is to re-
place both the selfless-mother model and the breadwinner model with the 
model of a balanced worker, one who combines serious work commitments 
with serious family commitments and also with serious commitments to 
long-term self-development and enriching community life.”52 
For Williams, this project requires a new way of thinking about femi-
nism. She explains that feminism has long been “divided into those who 
believe[] that women should be treated the same as men (‘sameness femi-
nists’) and those who believe that women were, in fact, different from men 
and that courts and legislators should recognize and act on that fact (‘dif-
ference feminists’).”53 That divide has been particularly prevalent in femi-
nist thinking about work-family issues. To “bust[] out of the frame of the 
sameness-difference debate,” Williams offers two new categories – assimi-
lationist feminism and reconstructive feminism.
54
 
Assimilationist feminism, as Williams defines it, focuses on women 
49. Id. at 107. 
50. Id. at 91; see also id. at 101-03. 
51. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
52. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 107. 
53. Id. at 111. Williams argues that the sameness/difference debate conflates two analytically dis-
tinct questions – the psychological question about whether there are “real” differences between men and 
women and the policy question of whether policies should treat men and women identically. Id. at 114. 
54. Id. at 114-15. 
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gaining access to traditionally male roles, rights, and privileges. She argues 
that it works well for some types of women – or, as I would prefer to put it, 
for some types of problems. Assimilationist feminism, for example, insists 
that women not be excluded from certain jobs due to their gender.
55
 There 
is no reason why women cannot be surgeons, or astronauts, or firefighters, 
for example. And assimilationist feminism insists that women should re-
ceive the same compensation as men for the same work. 
But what of women who are interested in a more traditional path? 
Williams explains: 
Assimilationist feminism works well to help the tomboys whose goal is 
to assimilate into masculine roles, but it offers little to feminists focused 
on women whose gender inequality stems from their insistence on “act-
ing femmy.” One such group is homemakers who are divorced after dec-
ades out of the labor force. A second is employed women who do femmy 
things like getting pregnant.
56
 
Williams insists that the interests of “femmes” (women who conform 
to traditionally feminine norms), as well as “tomboys” (who conform to 
traditionally masculine norms), are essential to the feminist project of im-
proving the lives of real women.  As an alternative to assimilationist femi-
nism, therefore, Williams offers what she calls reconstructive feminism, 
because many, even most, women do not want to achieve equality by as-
similating. For these women, “equality first requires changing masculine 
norms to allow women, as well as men, to have both conventional careers 
and a conventional family life.”57 
For reconstructive feminism, the centrality of masculine norms in the 
workplace is the key problem for men and women alike. “The question is 
not whether physical, social, and psychological differences between men 
and women exist. It is why these particular differences become salient in a 
particular context and then are used to create and justify women’s continu-
ing economic disadvantage.”58 Pregnancy is one obvious example (and one 
in which the biological difference between men and women cannot be ig-
nored). “The only reason pregnancy represents a problem for employed 
women is because the ideal-worker norm is designed around someone with 
a man’s body (no time off for childbearing) and men’s traditional life pat-
terns (no time off for child rearing or other care work).”59 At the same time, 
reconstructive feminism refuses to accept that traditional feminine behavior 
55. Id. at 116. 
56. Id. at 116-17. 
57. Id. at 127. 
58. Id. at 128. 
59. Id. at 129. 
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or traits – being nurturing, caring, emotionally expressive, for example, or 
becoming full-time, stay-at-home parents – represent women’s true nature, 
one that is inherently different from men. Rather, she argues, such behavior 
and characteristics represent “conventional femininity.”60 
This distinction is important theoretically, but it is perhaps just as im-
portant strategically. Calling conventional femininity the true nature of 
women “is greeted with howls of protests by the tomboys.”61 Instead, we 
should recognize that tomboys and femmes “feel the pinch” of gender 
norms in different ways.
62
 Femmes are economically disadvantaged; tom-
boys are called bad mothers or penalized for not being feminine enough. In 
the workplace, women are less likely than men to negotiate effectively for 
high salaries or plum job assignments. Conventionally feminine women 
may be unwilling to engage in hard bargaining. Yet women who are will-
ing to engage in this hard bargaining may well find themselves penalized 
for not being feminine enough. The solution, Williams argues, is 
to design a compensation system . . . that [] does not systematically dis-
advantage women. . . . [T]o do so requires jettisoning a system that gives 
good starting salaries, and good raises, only to those people who negoti-
ate hard and self-promote well and replacing it with a system that does 
not systematically reward masculinity.
63
 
And such a system will benefit not just women, but also “that broad band 
of men . . . who are not comfortable with ‘hard-hitting,’ self-promoting, 
conventional masculinity.”64 
Williams’ analysis is compelling and persuasive. I wish, however, that 
she had avoided relying on a different set of stereotypes – femmes and 
tomboys. The terms are extremely evocative, but Williams uses them too 
glibly. At one point, she does explain that she does not mean to categorize 
women as fitting exclusively into one of the other category: 
Most women engage in delicate, ongoing negotiations both with mascu-
linity and femininity, participating in both traditions in different melds 
that vary in different social contexts, as when a woman dresses in a hard 
hat and acts tough at work but changes into a dress and flirts at din-
ner . . . Though most women adopt some masculine strategies, very few 
perform conventional masculinity top to bottom.
65
 
But this disclaimer comes long after she begins using the terms and is 
somewhat buried in a discussion of assimilationist feminism. I appreciate 
60. Id. at 134. 
61. Id. at 135. 
62. Id. at 135-36. 
63. Id. at 141. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 122. 
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Williams’ wit and the value of a pithy turn of phrase, but I found the terms 
alienating. 
Likewise, Williams overstates her case when she talks about assimila-
tionist feminism being good for some types of women. It would be better to 
say that assimilationist feminism is good for solving some types of prob-
lems, but those problems might be faced by a host of different types of 
women, whose “delicate, ongoing negotiation with masculinity and femi-
ninity”66 may lead them to strike all kinds of different balances in different 
contexts. Williams, of course, knows this. Her vision of reconstructive fem-
inism, for example, allows for the possibility that “the experience of gender 
differs by race.”67  
In fact, one of the strengths of reconstructive feminism is that it is re-
markably non-prescriptive. Williams is consistently respectful of choices 
other people make, even when those choices reinforce separate spheres 
ideology.  Indeed, Williams takes to task some contemporary feminist au-
thors who argue that women should not leave the workforce, in particular 
Linda Hirshman and Leslie Bennetts.
68
 Although they argue (correctly) that 
women face significant economic risks if they leave the workforce, they 
also – and  more problematically – speak with disdain about stay-at-home 
mothers, comparing them to children and servants.
69
 Such rhetoric only di-
vides women, insulting those who have made the choices Hirshman and 
Bennetts disapprove of and alienating third-wave feminists who explicitly 
seek ways to retain traditionally feminine attributes.
70
 As Williams says 
elsewhere, “Each of us must do what we must do to make ourselves feel 
safe and whole.”71 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 145. This area is understudied, but Williams cites some interesting research. Psycholo-
gist Maureen Perry Jenkins, for example, 
found marked differences by race in the psychological effects of work-family conflict. 
Immigrant Latina women were most likely to experience depression when they returned 
to work after the birth of a child, reflecting strong norms against employed mothers in 
Latin American cultures. African American mothers experienced the lowest levels of de-
pression upon their return to work, reflecting their cultural norm that paid work is an in-
tegral part of responsible motherhood. White women were in the middle . . . . 
Id. at 147-48. None of these groups of women are more authentically female than the others. 
68. See LESLIE BENNETTS, THE FEMININE MISTAKE: ARE WE GIVING UP TOO MUCH? (2007); 
LINDA HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE WORLD (2006). 
69. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 124-25. 
70. Id. at 125-26. Williams revisits this point in a particularly down-to-earth way in her response 
to contributors to a Seattle Law Review symposium on Reshaping the Work-Family Debate. Reflecting 
on “young women lawyers [who] flock to high heels,” she says,”[i]f that’s what it takes for them to be 
hard-driving professionals, who am I to judge? They may need a foot operation by the time they are my 
age, but my solutions were hardly perfect either.” Williams, supra note 5, at 853. 
71. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 853. 
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III. CLASS AT HOME AND AT WORK
The portion of Reshaping the Work-Family Debate that focuses on 
class is a tour-de-force. Williams conveys with both compassion and detail 
the struggles that working class families face in balancing work and family, 
and she illuminates how they differ from upper middle class workers. She 
explores the role of masculinity for white working class men in ways that 
highlights their similarities and differences from their counterparts in the 
upper middle class, or as she calls it, the professional-managerial class or 
PMC. Most intriguingly, she delves into sources of conflict between the 
working class and the PMC, illuminating tensions and differences that 
many of her readers, as PMC members themselves, may be entirely una-
ware of. 
A. Work-Family Conflict and the Working Class 
Although she is not always explicit about it as she might be, Williams’ 
discussion of the ideal worker and the toll it takes on men and women alike 
is largely a discussion of dynamics for the PMC. But as she repeatedly em-
phasizes, work-family conflict is not a problem unique to this group. To the 
contrary, working class families face their own significant challenges, ex-
acerbated by the fact that for many such families, “opting out” is simply 
not a financial possibility. 
Williams brings working class work-family conflict vividly to life in 
an early chapter, entitled One Sick Child Away from Being Fired, which is 
based on a Center for WorkLife Law report of the same name.
72
 The meth-
odology, which is brilliant, involved cataloging the experiences of workers 
as reported in union arbitrations.
73
 The point is not to show whether these 
workers win at arbitration. (Some do and some don’t.) Rather, the point is 
to illustrate the ways in which work-family conflict affects the working 
class. There is every reason to believe that non-unionized workers, who 
constitute the vast majority of the American workforce, experience the 
same kinds of challenges as the unionized workers whose stories are re-
counted in the arbitrations. Indeed, it is likely that such workers face such 
challenges even more frequently and with even more dire consequences to 
their economic well-being than their unionized counterparts. After all, 
without a union contract, they can generally be fired or have the terms of 
72. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 42-76. In that study, the full name of which is One Sick Child
Away from Being Fired: When Opting Out Is Not an Option, the Center studied ninety-nine union arbi-
trations.  
73. Id. at 43-44. 
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their employment abruptly changed with no recourse. 
The arbitration reports reveal the working class version of the ideal 
worker expectation and they paint a picture of inflexible, often unpredicta-
ble, and sometimes unforgiving workplaces.
74
 Work schedules may be both 
inflexible – meaning that workers are disciplined or fired for being even a 
few minutes late or for missing work for any reason, however important – 
and unpredictable – meaning that workers must be ever-available. In one 
case that Williams reports, for example, a police officer was fired when she 
failed to report for an unscheduled shift she was suddenly called in for be-
cause she was unable to make child care arrangements.
75
 Her employer 
took the position that it was her responsibility “to have her family life se-
cured in a manner that does not conflict with her professional responsibili-
ties.”76 
This attitude pervades many of the stories Williams reports. Some 
workers lose their jobs or are disciplined when both their regular and their 
back-up child care arrangements fall through. In one case, for example, a 
customer service representative for the Social Security Administration 
missed work when “her regular babysitter had car problems and her backup 
babysitter’s husband was hospitalized with a heart attack.”77 Arbitrators are 
often sympathetic to such workers, but non-unionized workers in these sit-
uations are often simply – and legally – fired. 
Other workers face job loss when they refuse mandatory overtime, 
which is often imposed with little or no notice. In several cases Williams 
reports, workers – sometimes longtime, high-performing employees – were 
fired when they refused the overtime because they had no child care cover-
age.
78
 In another case, an employee was fired despite serving the mandato-
ry overtime because she resolved the child care crisis it engendered by hav-
ing her children come to her workplace.
79
 
Child care presents significant challenges to working class families in 
other ways as well. Many workers are required to work nonstandard hours, 
when reliable child care may be unavailable, and their unpredictable sched-
ules make consistent arrangements impossible. And child care is expensive. 
In part as a result of these factors, “working class families typically patch 
together a crazy quilt of family-delivered care.”80 Not surprisingly, such 
74. Id. at 44. 
75. Id. at 64-65. 
76. Id. at 65. 
77. Id. at 47. 
78. Id. at 53. 
79. Id. at 54. 
80. Id. at 46. 
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“fragile, patched-together systems often break down,”81 jeopardizing work-
ers’ jobs. 
Some dual-earner working class couples “tag team” in order to man-
age child care responsibilities.
82
 One member of the couple works a day 
shift and the other works at night, and they share child care responsibilities. 
This may solve the child care problem, but it can cause other significant 
problems in family life. Williams reports the observations of one union ac-
tivist: 
When I talk to working women and ask them, do you have flexibility, 
and they say, oh yeah, I’ve got a flexible schedule; I work nights and my 
husband works days. [What they mean is] I don’t have to pay a baby-
sitter because somehow we manage but I haven’t seen my husband in 
four years.
83
 
And tag-teaming couples are particularly vulnerable to unexpected sched-
ule changes and mandatory overtime without adequate notice, which can 
require them to choose between the husband’s job and the wife’s job. 
Overall, the picture Williams paints of work-family conflict for the 
working class is of a high-wire act with no net. It works when everything 
goes well, but if someone slips, even slightly, everything can come crash-
ing down. Sick children, needy elderly relatives, and important school-
related conferences – entirely predictable aspects of most people’s lives – 
much less unexpected family crises, are simply outside the margin of error 
for many in the working class. And to make matters worse, many of them 
cannot even make a personal phone call during the course of their workday, 
something that most upper middle class workers take entirely for granted.
84
 
B. Class and Masculinity 
Not surprisingly, Williams identifies statutory initiatives or union-
negotiated arrangements that would make a tremendous difference in the 
lives of these workers: paid sick leave that could be used for family mem-
bers’ illnesses and for well-child visits to the doctor,85 as well as other 
types of short-term leave,
86
 and a system of mandatory overtime that pro-
vides sufficient flexibility and notice while also meeting employers’ 
needs.
87
 She also identifies concrete legal questions that remain unresolved: 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 48. 
83. Id. at 200 (quoting Naomi Gerstel & Dan Clawson, Unions Response to Family Concerns, in 
FAMILIES AT WORK: EXPANDING THE BOUNDS 317, 325 (Naomi Gerstel et al. eds., 2002)). 
84. Id. at 43. 
85. Id. at 50-51. 
86. Id. at 73. 
87. Id. at 52-53, 73-74. 
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For example, in a “no-fault” progressive discipline system, where workers 
accumulate points for absenteeism, regardless of the cause, can “absences 
covered by the FMLA [] be legitimately treated as garnering points”?88 
More interesting, however, are Williams’ arguments about the role of 
work and family, particularly for men, in the lives of the working class, as 
compared to the upper middle class.
89
 For working class men as for upper 
middle class men, providing for one’s family is central to masculinity. But 
in contrast to many professional men, it is unlikely that a working class 
man can support his family on his wages alone. The loss of this “ability to 
achieve the [male] breadwinner ideal” is “one of the ‘hidden injuries of 
class’”90 for men in this group and is a source of frustration and resentment. 
At the same time, however, many working class men provide signifi-
cant child care, often in a tag-teaming arrangement. One of Williams’ most 
incisive observations is that although PMC men are more likely than work-
ing class men to espouse egalitarian views of gender roles, when it comes 
to actually “walk[ing] the walk,” working class men share household and 
child care duties with their wives much more equitably than do upper mid-
dle class men.
91
 And as Williams documents, working class men are more 
likely to have “routine involvement in the lives of their children,” unlike 
many PMC men who “define[] fathering as participation at public (typical-
ly sports) events.”92 Working class men are aware of these differences and  
see the “work devotion” and long hours of upper middle class men as nar-
cissistic
93
 and “an unseemly devaluation of family life.”94 
Because of their significant child care responsibilities, working class 
88. Id. at 46.  The FMLA is the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., which 
provides 12 weeks of unpaid leave to eligible workers for their own or a close family member’s serious 
medical condition or for the birth or adoption of a child.  Recent amendments also provide leave to fam-
ily members of those in the military under certain circumstances. 
89. Williams “abandons the distinction between ‘working class’ and ‘middle class,’” as being un-
helpful in today’s service economy. Id. at 155. She combines the groups and refers to them interchange-
ably as the Missing Middle and the working class. Id. at 156. 
90. Id. at 59 (quoting RICHARD SENNETT & JONATHAN COBB, THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS
(1973)). 
91. Id. at 59 (quoting Williams, supra note 8, at 240).  See also Williams, supra note 1, at 159.
92. Id. at 159. 
93. Id. at 189. 
94. Id. at 186. There is some inherent contradiction here, however.  On the one hand, working 
class men are often disparaging of the “work devotion” of their upper middle class counterparts because 
that work devotion gives them little time with their families. On the other hand, many of these men pro-
fess a preference for a traditional home arrangement, whereby their wives stay home full-time. And at 
least in the current economy, many working class men (and women) are “underutilized” by their em-
ployers. Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2010). In 
addition, some working class jobs, like firefighters, are popular in large part because they allow moon-
lighting – working even more hours. It therefore seems likely to me that at least some of the working 
class disparagement of upper middle class men’s working hours is sour grapes. 
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men often face challenges when there are child care breakdowns or when 
they (or their wives) are ordered to work overtime. In this way, their expe-
riences may be quite different from the upper middle class. Yet, like Rich, 
the engineer who was afraid to tell his boss when he needed to miss a work 
meeting for a family-related reason, “some men [in the arbitrations Wil-
liams studied] were willing to risk discipline or even discharge rather than 
tell their employers that they needed to leave work to care for children.”95 
Despite their commitment to their families and an oft-stated belief that 
“family comes first,”96 many working class men are apparently willing to 
appear insubordinate, risking their jobs, rather than admit to caregiving re-
sponsibilities. Masculinity apparently requires no less. 
Williams argues that working class men’s views about family and 
their personal experiences facing work-family conflict present an oppor-
tunity for unions: “Unions need a new message of manly solidarity: ‘Just 
because the boss’ gives me a job doesn’t mean he can forbid me from put-
ting family first.’”97 Or as she puts it elsewhere, “no wage-and-benefits 
package is of much use to a worker who gets fired for putting family 
first.”98 
If unions can persuade men to think about their need to leave [work] for 
family reasons as an issue of worker empowerment, rather than as a situ-
ation that advertises their inability to be good providers, family caregiv-
ing can become an effective organizing issue rather than a key cause of 
worker vulnerability.
99
 
These same opportunities are available to activists and politicians. But to 
take advantage of these issues as organizing tools, Williams argues, alli-
ances must be built (or rebuilt). And that is the primary project of the last 
two chapters of the book. 
C. The Politics of Class 
In a sense, the last two chapters of Reshaping the Work-Family De-
bate – especially the sixth and final chapter, Culture Wars as Class Conflict 
– belong in a different book. That statement is not so much a criticism as a
95. Id. at 56-57. 
96. Id. at 62. 
97. Id. at 44. 
98. Id. at 62. 
99. Id. at 61. Williams explicitly discusses the importance to employers of a reliable workforce.
But she argues that flexibility is often more achievable for working class jobs than people assume. In 
part, this assumption is a function of class bias. “The misconception that flexibility is not suitable in 
working-class jobs stems chiefly from the assumption that workplace flexibility is available only by 
means of individualized arrangements negotiated between individual workers and individual supervi-
sors,” which is the model most professionals are used to seeing. Id. at 72. 
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reflection of their ambition and wide-ranging political implications. Rather 
than an analysis of gender and class at home and at work, these chapters are 
about why the white working class has abandoned the New Deal Coali-
tion,
100
 and why they do not embrace the kinds of progressive policies that 
Williams and (she clearly presumes in these chapters) her readers promote. 
Certainly these chapters should be required reading for progressive politi-
cians and activists regardless of the issues they focus on. Indeed, the strug-
gles that the Democratic Party faces in attracting the support of the white 
working class do not appear to be abating, even as they remain important to 
electoral success.
101
 
Williams frames her discussion with this analysis: 
The accepted wisdom attributes working-class whites’ defection from the 
Democratic Party to race and religion. Both no doubt have played im-
portant roles. But race and religion do not tell the whole story. Under-
standing the alienation of the white working class is not only about race 
and religion but also about class – about a deeply patterned series of 
class conflicts between socially conscious progressives and working 
class whites.
102
 
Healing this rift between classes is essential, Williams argues, because 
“the progressive center of gravity is upper-middle class.”103 In other words, 
if the working class considers members of the PMC to be elitist and conde-
scending and not to share their values, they will neither trust nor work with 
the “‘well-educated, culturally libertarian, relatively affluent progressive 
elite . . . that sets the agenda for the Democratic Party.’”104 
A significant step in this healing process requires the progressive elite 
to appreciate the reduced financial and social circumstances in which the 
white working class finds itself. Working class income has fallen over the 
past 30 to 40 years when measured in real dollars. “The wages of white 
100.  The New Deal coalition, 
under which Democrats won the presidency seven out of ten times between 1932 and 
1968, was anchored by unions and blue-collar workers, bound in coalition with white 
Southerners, Catholics, intellectuals, and blacks. Circa 1970, Democrats moved away 
from the old electoral coalition and replaced it with a new one. 
Id. at 193. George McGovern in particular moved away from the blue-collar base and turned to young 
upper-middle class activists, whose hippie activism and drug use were an affront to the settled working 
class. Id. at 193-94.  
 101.  See, e.g., Ruy Teixeira, The White Working Class: The Group That Will Likely Decide 
Obama’s Fate, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), <http://www.tnr.com/article/ poli-
tics/90241/obama-election-2012-working-class-kerry>.  But see Ruy Texiera and John Halpin, The 
Path to 270: Demographics versus Economics in the 2012 Election, at 5 (Center for American Progress, 
November 2011) (available at http://www.americanprogress.org//issues/2011/11/pdf/path_to_270.pdf) 
(explaining how Obama might win the 2012 election even while suffering “a landslide defeat of 2010 
proportions among white working class voters…”). 
102.  Williams, supra note 1, at 153-53. 
103. Id. at 153. 
104. Id. at 193 (quoting Thomas Edsall, Rebuilding Red America 18 (2006)). 
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working-class men fell 15 percent between 1979 and 1998.”105 As a result, 
two working class incomes are generally required to support a family. Yet, 
as intimated earlier in the discussion of the “hidden injuries of class,” 
“[b]ecause breadwinner-homemaker families have signaled middle-class 
status since the 1780s, successful performance of these roles is seen as vital 
among working-class families who aspire to upward mobility. Convention-
al gender performance, in short, is a class act.”106 Thus, while progressives 
may look at white working class white men and see a group “privileged as 
whites, privileged as men, ‘relatively privileged’ as more affluent than the 
poor,’” these men see themselves differently. “When they compare their 
current situation with what their fathers and grandfathers could expect – 
and deliver – they do not feel privileged. Many feel cheated.”107 Progres-
sives’ failure to appreciate the ways in which this electorally and culturally 
important group is in fact not privileged has been devastating to coalition 
building. 
Williams’ discussion of the various ways in which the progressive 
elite alienates and misunderstands the white working class (and vice versa) 
is fascinating. The two groups have different values, as exemplified by 
working class men’s disdain towards professional men’s work devotion. 
Even ostensibly trivial things, such as coffee, food, and preferences about 
socializing are heavily freighted with class significance.
108
 Democratic 
politicians have repeatedly caused trouble for themselves by failing to rec-
ognize these dynamics. (Think Barack Obama talking about the price of ar-
ugula in Iowa.)
109
 Williams repeatedly admonishes her (presumably) PMC 
readership that they must make “casual insults leveled by progressives to-
ward the white working class” as taboo as racist or sexist jokes.110 
Many of Williams’ examples of the disconnect between the PMC and 
the working class relate more to family and lifestyle than to work. Child-
rearing is one arena. Upper middle class children are heavily scheduled but 
are also allowed to “talk back” to their parents in ways that shock members 
of the working class. Working class children, in contrast, may have larger 
amounts of unstructured time and may be supervised more loosely, but they 
105.  Id. at 157. 
 106.  Id. at 158. Working-class women, on the other hand, may have a slightly more subtle version 
of the same class envy. They aspire to part-time work, perhaps because they see it as “the nontraditional 
pattern that predominates among the” PMC. Id. at 159. 
107.  Id. at 160; see also id. at 185. 
108.  Id. at 171-74 (citing MARJORIE L. DEVAULT, FEEDING THE FAMILY: THE SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION OF CARING AS GENDERED WORK (1991)). Williams’ discussions of food and entertain-
ing are particularly fascinating. 
109. Id. at 187. 
110.  Id. at 152. 
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are expected to be respectful and obedient to adults.
111
 
These differences in child-rearing priorities largely map onto differ-
ences in the cultural capital needed to navigate the upper-middle-class 
world and to navigate the working class world, and it is these differences 
that can drive a wedge between the PMC and the working class. PMC 
families work hard to ensure that their children will be able to attend a 
four-year college – at least. Successful professionals generally have “verbal 
adeptness and a delicate combination of independent judgment” and “peo-
ple skills,”112 so members of the PMC work hard to ensure that their chil-
dren develop these attributes. They therefore focus on achievement and 
self-actualization for their children and for themselves. 
In the working class, on the other hand, independence and intellectual 
curiosity are not necessarily useful, and, if displayed too prominently, can 
even “get you fired.”113 Asking questions, often encouraged at the PMC 
family dinner table,
114
 is sometimes treated as impertinence or disrespect in 
working class families.
115
 Rather than focusing on their children’s 
achievement and stimulation, working class families are more likely to fo-
cus on stability and obedience; self-regulation rather than self-
actualization.
116
 At the same time, members of the working class, especially 
men, are likely to see the people skills necessary to success in a profession-
al or managerial career – “tact, friendliness, conflict avoidance, and team-
work” – as “being fake or playing workplace politics.”117 
There are important political consequences to these differences in cul-
tural style, according to Williams. “Workers’ appreciation for plain talk 
presents challenges for upper-middle-class individuals in public life. Talk 
that seems no more than thoughtful and intelligent [to the PMC] may be 
seen as an arrogant display of cultural capital and a class affront.”118 As a 
result, “[p]rogressives need to learn to speak to non-college-educated peo-
ple in language they can relate to, bearing in mind that just because people 
have not graduated from college (or from a fancy college) does not mean 
 111. Id. at 166-68 (citing generally ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND 
FAMILY LIFE (2003)). 
112. Id. at 163. 
113.  Id.  
114. Id. at 174. 
115.  Id. at 191. 
116. Williams explains in some detail how the “settled working class” defines itself in opposition to 
the “hard living,” whom they look down on as unreliable and irresponsible. E.g., id. at 164-66. One of 
those important distinctions is the ability to control impulses and act responsibly. 
117. Id. at 182.  
118. Id. at 183. 
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they are unintelligent.”119 
One of Williams’ significant contributions, as Professor Lisa Pruitt 
has pointed out, is to insist that members or the progressive elite must “see” 
class, just as critical race scholars insisted that white people see race.
120
 In a 
world where almost everyone believes that they are middle class – even 
people at the ninety-fifth percentile in income
121
 – and in a country with a 
foundational belief in class mobility (“anyone can grow up to be presi-
dent”), it is easy for those near the top, to pretend that class differences do 
not exist. But the working class is acutely aware of class. Members of the 
working class often have enormous resentment towards managers and pro-
fessionals who they believe tell them what to do without really knowing 
what they are talking about and/or cheat them or talk down to them. “Man-
agers . . . are college kids ‘who don’t know shit about how to do anything, 
but,’ as one worker put it, ‘are full of ideas about how I have to do my 
job.’”122 “People with less education often see professionals as exercising 
arrogant, unchecked power over their lives.”123 
As a result, Williams argues, “Democratic candidates need to become 
more self-aware about the ways their everyday speech and actions signal a 
specific class location.”124 More specifically, she offers two rules for Dem-
ocratic candidates. First, they “should never get into a situation of explain-
ing the less privileged to the elite,” as Barack Obama did with his “clinging 
to guns and religion” comment.125 Second, intellectual discussion and semi-
therapeutic self-analysis that sounds thoughtful to the elite sounds self-
indulgent and wimpy to the working class. Asking probing questions or 
talking about one’s problems are seen as self-indulgent or irritating. It’s a 
“class act.”126 
Williams explores the implications of these cultural differences for a 
range of political issues, from abortion, to support for the military, to gay 
119.  Id. at 185. 
120.  Pruitt, supra note 9, at 771. 
121.  Catherine Rampell, Rich People Still Don’t Realize They’re Rich, ECONOMIX, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 19, 2011, 1:41 PM), <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/rich-people-still-dont-
realize-theyre-rich/>. 
122.  WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 188. 
 123.  Id. The same resentment is not directed towards the rich. “[W]orkers . . . tend to dream not of 
professional credentials, but of the independence that flows from owning a business.” Id. “While the 
upper-middle class is seen as having a different culture, the rich are seen as just having more money. 
Thus workers (black as well as white) rank income above education in evaluating people’s worth.” Id. 
at 189. Of course, workers encounter members of the PMC regularly, but they do not have regular in-
teractions with the extremely rich. 
124.  Id. at 187. 
125. Id. at 191. 
126.  Id. at 192. 
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rights. She sees today’s culture wars as symptoms of class conflict. While I 
(and others) think that she may understate the role of racial resentment or 
conflict,
127
 her insistence on understanding white working class concerns in 
terms largely unrelated to race is both enlightening and humanizing. 
IV. MOVING FORWARD
A. Organizing Around Love and Work 
Sigmund Freud has been oft-quoted as describing a healthy adult as 
someone who is able to work and to love.
128
 Because work and family 
(love) are so fundamental to most people’s identities, people may be re-
sistant to thinking about them in new ways. Will working class men buy 
unions’ arguments for organizing around flexibility and predictability if 
they are couched in terms of “manly solidarity?”129 Will PMC men recog-
nize that the long hours they work, while ostensibly for their families, in 
fact deprive themselves and their wives and children of important emotion-
al connections? 
Part of the answer, I think, lies in recognizing a human tendency to be-
lieve in one’s own agency. A difficult situation can sometimes seem more 
palatable if you believe that you chose it. Hence, PMC women who leave 
the workforce talk about it in terms of choice. Professionals who work huge 
numbers of hours often believe themselves motivated by a desire for per-
sonal achievement. Concretely, I think that Williams’ agenda can be more 
successful if she and others tap into this desire for agency. Unions may be 
particularly well-positioned to exploit it. Obviously, unions have to focus 
on particular issues of concern in their organizing campaigns, but they can 
also focus on the power that organized workers have to make positive 
change, to exercise agency. And because the changes here cut to the heart 
of people’s sense of self – work and love – perhaps the fundamental nature 
of the issues can be used to help encourage people to act. 
I see some evidence to support such optimism in the generational 
shifts in PMC attitudes towards work and family that Williams describes. 
Second wave feminists, reacting to the rigid gender roles of the 1950s, in-
sisted on meaningful work, although many felt that they had no choice but 
 127.  See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Joan Williams, Coalitions, and Getting Beyond the Wages of 
Whiteness and the Wages of Maleness, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 825 (2011); Richard Delgado, Race, Sex, 
and the Division of Labor: A Comment on Joan Williams’s Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 835 (2011). 
 128. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 88 (James Strachey ed. & 
trans., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2005) (1930). 
129.  See Silbaugh, supra note 5, at 747. 
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to embrace the ideal worker role. Many younger women have rejected the 
all-or-nothing workplace, asking for reduced-hours arrangements, for ex-
ample, in law firms and other professional environments. These women 
want to love and to work. And as Williams intimates, Gen X and Gen Y 
men, as well as women, are beginning to make similar demands.
130
 In other 
words, some people, at least sometimes, are willing to challenge orthodox-
ies about how work and family relate. 
In today’s economy, of course, agitating for change in the workplace 
may feel particularly risky, and cross-class solidarity may be harder than 
ever to achieve.
131
 As of this writing, the national unemployment rate is at 
8.6 percent,
132
 more than five and a half million Americans have been un-
employed for more than six months,
133
 and concerns about a “double-dip 
recession” persist.134 More problematic for Williams’ agenda is that unem-
ployment rates decline steeply as education levels increase. For high school 
graduates over 25 years old, unemployment is at 10.0 percent, more than 
double the rate for workers over 25 with college degrees or higher, whose 
rate stood at 5.1 percent in November 2011.
135
 Such differences affect not 
only the economic stability of the less-educated workers, their families, and 
their communities but may also exacerbate the class resentments that Wil-
liams explores. 
At the same time, unions are under attack. In Wisconsin and Ohio, for 
example, newly elected Republican governors pushed through legislation to 
eliminate most collective bargaining rights for public sector unions.
136
 Un-
130.  WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 89. 
 131.  Others have likewise argued that Williams underestimates the difficulty of building cross-class 
coalitions. See, e.g., Chang, supra  note 127; Jean Stefancic, Talk the Talk, But Walk the Walk: A Com-
ment on Joan Williams’s Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 815, 821 (2011). 
132.  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employment Situation Sum-
mary (Dec. 2, 2011), available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm> (last visited Dec. 
5, 2011) (hard copy on file with the author).  This 8.6 percent unemployment rate represents a decline 
from previous months.  Id. 
133.  Id., Table A-12. 
 134.  See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Time to Say It: Double Dip Recession May Be Happening, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at B1, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/business/economy/ 
double-dip-recession-may-be-returning.html>; Odds of ‘double-dip recession about 50-50, S.F. Fed 
report says, L.A. TIMES MONEY &  COMPANY BLOG, Nov. 14, 2011, available at <http:// 
latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/11/chance-of-recession-high-sf-fed-report-says.html>. 
135.  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 132, tbl. A-4, available at <http:// 
www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t04.htm>. The situation is most shockingly dire for workers with less 
than a high school diploma, whose unemployment rate is 13.8 percent. Id. 
 136.  Stephanie Condon, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Signs Anti-Union Bill – But Democrats Say 
they’re Political Victors, POLTICALFACTSHEET, CBS News (Mar. 13, 2011, 11:19 AM), <http://www. 
cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20042122-503544.html>; Steven Greenhouse, Ohio’s Anti-Union Law 
Is Tougher Than Wisconsin’s, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A16, available at <http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/04/01/us/01ohio.html>. 
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ion density for private sector workers is at a remarkably low 6.9 percent.
137
 
But even in this environment, there are opportunities. Although unem-
ployment rates vary with education level, once unemployed, a PMC worker 
is just as likely to face longterm unemployment as are members of the 
working class.
138
 Smart activists may be able to use this fact to try to bridge 
some of the class divides that Williams discusses. The attacks on unions 
have motivated progressive activists to find common cause with the work-
ing class. In Wisconsin, Democrats spearheaded a recall campaign to oust 
Republican state senators who voted to strip unions of collective bargaining 
rights, successfully defeating two of the three they targeted while fending 
off Republican attempts to recall several Democratic state senators.
139
  
Wisconsin Democratsy are now attempting to recall the governor.
140
  In 
Ohio, activists succeeded in placing repeal of their state’s anti-labor law on 
the ballot.  It was repealed with a resounding 62 percent of the vote.
141
 
The relative success of these campaigns, which are largely being 
waged at the level of state legislative districts, coupled with Williams’ ob-
servations about the mistrust and resentment with which many in the white 
working class view progressive activists suggest to me that coalition build-
ing of the sort Williams describes will more likely be successful if it is 
based on a strategy of locally-based organizing and face-to-face interac-
tion.
142
 It may be time for progressives to make the political personal. 
B. Who and What Are Missing? 
There are some types of workers, families, and problems that Wil-
liams neglects, although given the depth and insight of Reshaping the 
 137.  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members Summary 
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm>. 
 138.  Lila Shapiro, When A College Education Doesn’t Help You Find a Job, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (updated Mar. 23, 2011, 9:09 AM EST), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/16/when-a-
college-education-_n_836458.html>. 
 139. State of Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Election Results, 
http://gab.wi.gov/node/2008; We Are Wisconsin, Wisconsin Recall Races Redux: What We’ve Learned; 
What It Means (Aug. 16, 2011), available at <www.wearewisconsin.org/home-content/wisconsin-
recall-races-redux-what-we%E2%80%99ve-learned-what-it-means/> (hard copy on file with the au-
thor) (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
 140. Marti Mikkelson, Wisconsin Democrats Launch Governor Recall Effort (Nov. 15, 2011), 
available at <http://www.npr.org/2011/11/15/142326626/wisconsin-democrats-launch-walker-recall-
effort>. 
 141. Sabrina Tavernise, Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting Unions' Rights, N.Y. TIMES  (Nov. 8, 
2011), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/politics/ohio-turns-back-a-law-limiting-
unions-rights.html>. 
 142.  Such a strategy is not without its logistical difficulties. As one commentator argues, the class 
and cultural divide Williams describes is really a rural/urban divide. Pruitt, supra note 9. In other 
words, members of the different classes do not even live in the same regions, much less in the same 
neighborhoods. 
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Work-Family Debate, my comments here are better understood as sugges-
tions for future work than as criticism. To some extent, however, a focus on 
these matters will be necessary to build the coalitions Williams seeks. Race 
is one obvious arena that Williams neglects, although she explicitly 
acknowledges and explains her decision not to focus on the work-family 
and related issues of racial minorities, for which others have taken her to 
task.
143
 But there are some important groups and issues that she does not 
acknowledge even to that degree. Single parents, for example, get only 
passing mention, although she does report that divorce was an “unex-
pected” source of men’s work-family conflict in the study of union arbitra-
tions.
144
 Just as the public and media discussion of work-family conflict fo-
cuses on PMC women, as if the working class have no such conflicts, much 
of that discussion – including in this book – almost always assumes a two-
parent family. 
But this assumption is unwarranted. 41 percent of children born in the 
United States in 2009 were born out of wedlock.
145
 How do the mothers of 
those children handle work-family conflict? Williams notes that 32 percent 
of PMC single mothers work at least fifty hours a week.
146
 How does their 
experience relate to the ideal worker model? How might they be affected if 
it were dismantled? How do the other two-thirds of PMC single mothers 
balance their work and family commitments and at what cost to their eco-
nomic well-being? The experience of work-family conflict for single par-
ents may vary significantly with class, moreover, and out-of-wedlock births 
are substantially more common among those with high school diplomas but 
without college degrees than for more educated women.
147
 This area calls 
out for Williams’ attention. 
The prevalence of divorce also raises some important questions. What 
 143.  See, e.g., Chang, supra, note 132; Richard Delgado, Race, Sex, and the Division of Labor: A 
Comment on Joan Williams’s Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 835 (2011). 
 144.  WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 49. That it was unexpected is, I think, a function of Williams’ un-
due focus on two-parent families. 
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AM. PROGRESS & CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, THE 
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are the work-family conflicts of noncustodial parents, for example? Does 
the legal obligation to pay child support affect men’s attitudes towards their 
jobs? In addition, the demographics of divorce may have implications for 
our understanding of the complicated relationship between work, family, 
and class. Divorce rates fall with education level.
148
 In other words, a work-
ing class couple is much more likely to divorce than is a PMC couple. Does 
work-family conflict play a causal role in that difference? 
In discussing work-family conflict, Williams also focuses almost ex-
clusively on child-rearing, although she does mention elder care and she 
explicitly calls for a new  norm of a work life balanced with other activities 
(be they family or otherwise) that bring meaning to people’s lives. But 
more discussion of what is lost when people don’t have such balance is 
worth having. What happens to communities and their institutions, like 
churches, for example? Such questions have been addressed to some extent 
in other work,
149
 of course, but Williams’ skill in identifying the potential 
for relying on shared values as a foundation for coalition-building might 
make it worthwhile for her to address them. 
Finally, more historical perspective could be very illuminating. How is 
it that in 1960, when gender roles were particularly rigid and the assump-
tion that the (male) ideal worker would be supported by a steady flow of 
family and household work performed by his wife was largely warranted,
150
 
PMC men worked fewer hours than they do today? As Williams herself 
notes, the Ozzie-and-Harriet vision included a father who came home for 
dinner at 5 pm virtually every night, as few PMC fathers do today.
151
 What 
are the implications and causes of this increase in the demands on profes-
sional workers’ time at the same time that the flow of family and household 
work has become less available due to women’s participation in the work-
force? 
148.  Id. at 19, fig. 1. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Reshaping the Work-Family Debate is deeply illuminating. It is also 
deeply compassionate. A number of commentators have suggested that 
Williams’ recipe for political change is, essentially, that the elite should be 
nicer to the working class.
152
 I think this misapprehends her project. Wil-
liams takes what most people have in common – most fundamentally a love 
of family and a desire to feel that our work, whether in a lawyer’s office, in 
a factory, or at home, is meaningful – and tries to help us recognize that in 
each other. That is not about being nice. That is an insistence on seeing and 
respecting others as fully human, in all of their complexity. And Williams 
is just as insistent on this approach when she talks about feminists’ treat-
ment of other women and of men as much as when she talks about relations 
between members of different classes. Without such vision and respect, it is 
all too easy to overlook what we have in common, and it is all too easy to 
resort to stereotypes or to ideological prescriptions that alienate and insult 
our potential allies. As much as her intellectual rigor and ferocious drive, it 
is this compassion and insistence on our common humanity that sets Wil-
liams’ work apart. 
152.  See, e.g., Stefancic, supra note 131, at 821. 
